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William H. Simon: Thinking Like a Lawyer - About
Ethics*
William H. Simon1
Robert D. Taylor2
Bruce S. Ledewitz3

MargaretK Krasik4
The Reverend Sean P Kealy, C.S.Sp.
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* This is the edited text of a panel discussion held as part of the legal ethics curriculum
at Duquesne University Law School on October 24, 1999. The speakers have had the
opportunity to update and correct this text; therefore, this printed version may deviate
slightly from what was presented.
1. Keynote speaker, the Kenneth and Harle Montgomery Professor of Public Interest
Law at Stanford University.
2. Moderator, Thomas W. Henderson Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics, Duquesne
University Law School, B.S., M. Div., J.D.
3. Panelist, Professor of Law, Duquesne Law School, B.S.FS., J.D.
4. Panelist, Associate Professor of Law, Duquesne Law School, A-B., M.LS., J.D.
5. Panelist; Professor of Scripture and Chair of Theology, Duquesne University, M.A.,
S.T.L, LS.S.
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Dean Nicholas P Cafardi6
7
Thomas W. Henderson, Esq.
8
The Honorable Ronald W. Folino
PROFESSOR TAYLOR: Thank you all for being here. It is my real
pleasure this afternoon to officially open the first Thomas W.
Henderson Lecture in Legal Ethics.
This lecture is one that is dedicated to bringing cutting-edge
thinkers in legal ethics to this law school and the university. With
the generous gift of money from attorney Tom Henderson, we at
Duquesne University School of Law have been fashioning legal
ethics and professional responsibility as a unified motif of our legal
curriculum. First, we have increased the credit hour requirement
towards professional responsibility. Second, this theme has been
built into our first-year courses, our orientation program, and our
legal research and writing courses. Third, we have an ongoing
faculty study group, as well as a study group of alums and faculty,
who are currently engaged in reading and discussing philosophical
and ethical texts. Finally, we have been purchasing books and
videotapes on professional ethical themes for use by professors and
students.
Our ultimate desire, our wish list, so to speak, is to lay the
foundation for a new discipline, a new discipline, namely, a
discipline of comparative professional ethics under the theme of
professional leadership for the new millennium. You can read about
these and other matters in my regular column, in Juris [Duquesne
Law School's award-winning newsmagazine], called The Ethics
Corner,which will be appearing shortly.
Be this as it may, this academic year's high point commences this
afternoon because it is our good fortune to have with us William H.
Simon. You all know him as the author of the book that has been
assigned reading, The Practice of Justice, A Theory of Lawyers'
Ethics9 published by Harvard University Press. This book has
stimulated, prompted, caused, occasioned a vigorous discussion in
the academic community and among practitioners, both the bench
and the bar.
Bill has consulted widely on legal ethical matters and is active in
various legal aid programs. He has been teaching law now at
6.
7.
8.
9.

Panelist; Dean and Professor of Law, Duquesne Law School, Ph.B., M.A, J.D., J.C.L
Panelist; Distinguished Alumnus, Duquesne Law School, J.D.
Panelist; Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County, Pennsylvania.
William H. Simon, The Practice of Justice, A Theory of Lawyers' Ethics (1998).
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Stanford for approximately eighteen years, has been a visiting
professor at Harvard Law School and the University of California,
Berkeley School of Law. Prior to his career in teaching, he
practiced for several years, first as a courtroom litigator, and later
as a legal aid lawyer specializing in welfare matters.
Among his recent publications are The Kaye Scholer Affair: The
Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the Bar's Temptations of Evasion
and Apology, which appears in Law and Social Inquiry.10 His most
recent article has an intriguing oxymoronic title of Virtuous Lying,
subtitled A Critique in Quasi-Categorical Moralism, which
appears in the Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics."
In addition to various projects on professional responsibility, he
is presently engaged in the study of lawyer participation in
community economic development activities in low income
communities.
And I would also at this time like to introduce our distinguished
respondents, starting here with the Honorable Ronald Folino. He is
with the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Next, we
have Attorney Thomas W. Henderson himself, whose generosity has
made this discussion possible; Dean Nicolas P Cafardi, Dean of this
law school; of course, Bill Simon, our speaker; Father Sean P.
Kealy, who is Chair of the Department of Theology of Duquesne
University; and Duquesne University School of Law Professors
Margaret Krasik and Bruce Ledewitz.
It is now my pleasure to give you Professor Simon, who will
address you on the theme of thinking like a lawyer-about ethics.
PROFESSOR SIMON: Thank you. It's a great honor to be here. I'm
thrilled by your interest in my book. I'm thrilled even though I
recognize that the interest is, compulsory.
I want to thank Mr. Henderson for his support of this project, for
making this possible. I'm very grateful to Dean Cafardi. I want to
thank you for the wonderful hospitality that I've been shown, and
to Bob Taylor for setting this up.
You are fortunate to have such, an ambitious and stimulating
ethics program. In fact, at Stanford, we are revisiting our ethics
curriculum right now, and I'm going to take some of the ideas that
I've gotten from my visit back with me and talk to some people
10. William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair The Lawyer's Duty of Candor and the
Bar's Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 L & Soc. Inquiry 243 (Spring 1998).
11. William H. Simon, Virtuous Lying: A Critique of Quasi-CategoricalMoralism, 12
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 433 (1999).
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about possibly adapting them to our circumstances.
Let me begin by asking you to imagine that you're walking down
the street in your hometown, and an old high school acquaintance,
who we'll call Clyde Barrow, approaches you. You remember Clyde
as a loser; a poor student, often in trouble with the authorities, but
an appealing guy with a friendly manner and a sense of humor. He
tells you that he's here to rob a bank, but that the confederate who
is supposed to drive the get-away car hasn't shown up. He asks you
to step in and help out.
Now, before I proceed, let me allay your suspicions. I am not
going to argue that lawyers are like bank robbers. This is not going
to be an extended lawyer joke. I think lawyers are very different
from bank robbers. I think they occupy an honorable social role.
But I think it's important to think about the ways in which they are
different from bank robbers and from other actors in this society,
and to think about wherein their social honor lies. And my story is
designed to remind us of those differences.
Of course, you're shocked at Clyde's suggestion, and you say no.
Clyde is hurt at your glib response. "You're being selfish and
insensitive," he says, "I'm on the spot. I need help. You're the only
one I can turn to. I remember from high school that you're an
excellent driver. You have a valuable skill that you can use to help
others. And anyway, there's no one else here I know. This job has
to be pulled off before they close the vaults at 5 o'clock."
You say to Clyde that, if he's really desperate, you'll lend him
some money, but you think that robbing banks is wrong. He
becomes indignant. "How can you be so paternalistic?" he says.
"Who are you to impose your values on me? You're arrogating to
yourself the power to decide the difference between right and
wrong. You're playing God. How about some respect for my
freedom as an individual?"
You answer that you do respect him as an individual, but you
feel you owe some respect to the bank as well. "There you go
again," he replies, "always siding with the big guys. Here I am, all
by myself, facing the immense, power of concentrated wealth, and
you won't lend .me a hand." "It's not fair to steal, even from the
wealthy," you say. "Talk about fair?" he comes back. "Every day
guys are getting away with jobs like this. The only difference
between them and me is that they've got more reliable help. Is it
my fault that my partner bailed on me? All I'm asking for is an
equal chance."
So now, a little taken aback, you play your trump card: "Clyde,
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it's illegal," you say. "Says who?" he asks. "Well," you reply,
"Section 477 of the State Criminal Code makes it a crime to
'appropriate by force or fraud' funds from any bank within the
state."
Clyde says, "Yeah, I've read that section, but I don't think it's
applicable. I'm planning to go in with a toy gun, point it at the
teller and ask him, real nice, to hand over the money. I figure as
long as it's a toy gun, there's no force; and as long as I don't say it's
real, there's no fraud."
You inform Clyde that this ploy has already been anticipated in
the case of State versus Parker, where the state supreme court
upheld a conviction under Section 477 of a defendant who used a
toy gun.
"I read that case," Clyde says. "It's not on point. The guy there
was using a toy semiautomatic. I'm going to use a toy handgun."
You tell him you don't think that's a relevant distinction. And he
replies, "Who are you to say? You're not a judge. You're not a state
official. This isn't one of those totalitarian societies where every
private citizen is supposed to act like a lackey of the state." Then
he adds, "Anyway, aren't I innocent until proven guilty?"
"Well, that doesn't mean we can deliberately commit a crime,"
you say. "But after we do it, we'll still be innocent until proven
guilty, right?" he asks. "Yes," you answer. "And if they never prove
us guilty, we'll always be innocent." "Well... " "So let's just do it
and stay innocent."
Now, let's consider what distinguishes lawyers from people who
drive get-away cars in bank robberies. It isn't that they help people
in need. It isn't that they protect people's freedom. It's not that they
stand against the power of the state and concentrated wealth on
the side of the isolated individual. The difference lies in the fact
that they protect our clients' rights. Rights are different from
freedom, because rights are designed to allow a fair measure of
freedom on the part of others.
Now, the term "right" connotes two fairly different types of
judgment or analysis to the lawyer. On the one hand, "right" can be
the conclusion of a fairly mundane, straightforward reading of a
legal rule. If the rules say you can park twenty minutes where the
curb is painted green, you have a right to park twenty minutes
where the curb is painted green. On the other hand, "right" also
connotes a more ambitious and difficult claim that implicates more
basic values, the rights of due process or freedom of expression,
for example, that call for complex judgments about important
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issues of justice.
Sometimes we tend to identify the practical tasks of lawyering
with the more mundane and simple types of judgment. For
example, the legal theorist T.R. Powell once opined, "If you can
think of a subject that is inter-related and inextricably combined
with another subject without knowing anything or giving any
12
consideration to the second subject, then you have a legal mind."
He didn't intend this as flattery, however.
More flattering and more directly relevant to our subject is Lord
Brougham's famous description of the advocate's role. He
pronounced it in the course of the Trial of Queen Caroline in 1820.
"An advocate," he said, "knows but one person in the world: the
client, and none other. He must not regard the alarm, the suffering,
the torment, the destruction which he may bring upon any other."
Lawyers love to quote this speech and to note its stirring
context. Brougham was defending Queen Caroline against charges
of adultery brought by her husband, the King of England. He had in
his possession documentary evidence, the King's will, of a prior
secret marriage by the King, and he was giving notice that he was
prepared to offer this evidence even though some feared it might
bring down the monarchy.
Now, this conception of lawyer judgment as simple,
single-minded judgment continues to exercise a powerful hold on
the field of legal ethics. One of the most common objections to
ethical arguments that impute responsibility to lawyers to protect
the interests of non-clients, other than interests that are
unambiguously protected by explicit specified rules, is that such
responsibilities entail difficult judgments. People speak as if asking
the lawyer to make such judgments would be an intolerable
burden. Or alternatively, they note that there's often disagreement
about such judgments, and they imply that they couldn't have a
workable regime of professional regulation that depended on
judgments about which people disagreed.
When the American Bar Association produced the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct in 1983, they largely capitulated to objections
of this kind. One of the main goals of the drafters of the rule was
to produce a code that did not require difficult judgments. The
rules provide a "black letter rule for every case," as one of its
drafters boasted. 13 In many jurisdictions, as you know, legal ethics
12. Reprinted in

THURMAN ARNOLD, FMR FIGHTS AND

FouL 20-21 (1965).

13. See Geoffrey Hazard, Legal Ethics: Legal Rules and Professional Aspirations, 30
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is the only subject tested on the bar exclusively on a
machine-graded, multiple choice basis. Instructors in bar review
courses routinely warn their charges not to think too much about
the questions on the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam.
"What's being tested is your memory, not your ability to think,"
14
they say.
However, when we turn from the realm of professional ethics,
we find a different picture of legal judgment, at least in some areas.
In some areas, favorable portrayals of lawyering associate it with
an ambitious style of judgment. So compare Powell's disparaging
characterization of legal judgment mentioned above to Cardozo's
proud credo, announced, of all places, in an opinion interpreting a
15
tax statute: "Life in all its fullness must supply the answer."
Or, closer to home, think of the law school curriculum, especially
the first year. We don't introduce students to "thinking like a
lawyer" with black letter rules. You can go for weeks without
seeing any. Instead, we focus on case analysis, especially ones that
involve complex circumstances and difficult issues. The lesson,
more often than not, is that there are no categorical answers. Each
case stands for a principle that has to be given meaning through an
analysis of a particular constellation of facts. Think of Hawkins v.
McGee,'6 the case of the "hairy hand," which many of us, including
some of you, were introduced to in the first year of law school.
You came in thinking that determining the damages for negligent
hand injury would be a fairly mechanical matter. You're then made
to recognize that the general principle was compatible with at least
two broadly different understandings of damage: the expectation
approach, the difference between the hand as warranted and the
hand the plaintiff ended up with; and the reliance approach, the
difference between the hand he started out with and the hand that
he ended up with.
Neither of these rules will satisfactorily resolve all of the cases.
Once we figure which one applies, we have to engage in a
painstakingly contextual examination of the circumstances to apply
Clev. St. L Rev. 571, 574 (1982).
14. See Jarmie Heler, Letter to the Editor,N.Y. TmIEs, Dec. 16, 1994, at A38.
15. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933) ("Here, indeed, as so often in other
branches of the law, the decisive distinctions are those of degree and not of kind. One
struggles in vain for any verbal formula that will supply a ready touchstone. The standard set
up by the statute is not a rule of law; it is rather a way of life. Life in all its fullness must
supply the answer to the riddle.").
16.

146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
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it.
A few months later, you study the Palsgrafcase, 7 in which you
learn that causation is not just a fact that you observe
mechanically, but a policy judgment that can only be effectively
applied to an understanding of the particular circumstances.
Of course, we eventually do encounter a few rigid rules. For the
most part, however, they're either for people we don't trust, the
Miranda8 rules for the police, or issues we don't care much about,
like the "mailbox" rule for a contract problem that almost never
arises.
For the people we trust and the issues we care about, we have
norms of complex judgment, like due process, reliance, and
reasonableness. We don't leave these norms in their unelaborated
state. But instead of reducing them to black letter rules, we
elaborate them through rebuttable presumptions and illustrative
cases. A rebuttable presumption is a rule that we follow only after
we've determined that there are no circumstances that make it
inappropriate to do so in the case. An illustrative case is a norm
that we follow only after we've determined that the present case is
relevantly similar to it.
Or, again, think of malpractice adjudication. The standard of care
applied there to the lawyer is not defined in terms of black letter
rules. Lawyers can't defend against claims for negligence simply by
showing that their actions were not prohibited by the rules. And
plaintiffs can't establish liability simply by showing that the lawyer
has violated a black letter rule. Violation is only evidence of
negligence a rebuttable presumption of negligence. The
judgments that lawyers owe their clients under the negligence law
is not rule-bound, but complex and contextual, a judgment that
applies a wealth of partly tacit understanding to the full range of
circumstances of the case.
Justice O'Connor recognized this in explaining in Strickland v.
Washington 9 why the Supreme Court should not attempt to spell
out in black letter the meaning of effective assistance of counsel
for a criminal defendant:
No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can
satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances
faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions
17.
18.
19.

Paisgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. App. Div. 1928).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.20
2
Even the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
("Code") -- and here I'm talking about the first set of model norms
that the ABA promulgated in 1970 - when it's not talking about
the duties to third persons or to the public, speaks of lawyer
judgment in this kind of term. Especially revealing is Ethical
Consideration 3.5 on unauthorized practice.2 2 Here, the Code, in
explaining why lay people should not be allowed to practice law,
stops to acknowledge that some lay people, real estate brokers and
tax accountants, can, in fact, follow black letter rules in the areas
in which they practice. But, the Code says, the distinctive talents of
lawyers are called for in matters that require "professional
judgment."23 The Code then explains, "The essence of the
professional judgment of a lawyer is his educated ability to relate
the general body and philosophy of law to a specific legal
24
problem."
Now, my suggestion is that professional judgment, conceived
precisely in this way, ought to play a larger role than it does in
legal ethics doctrine. The fundamental injunction of this doctrine
ought to be the one that the first ABA Code, again the Model Code
of ProfessionalResponsibility, reserves for government lawyers, to
seek justice. And while this general norm should be fleshed out in
terms of more specific ones, the specific ones should take the form
not of black letter rules that obviate judgment, but of contextual
standards that engage the lawyer's capacities for complex
20. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89.
21. Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1969).
22. Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 3-5 (1980), which states in full as
follows:
It is neither necessary nor desirable to attempt the formulation of a single,
specific definition of what constitutes the practice of law. Functionally, the
practice of law relates to the rendition of services for others that call for the
professional judgment of a lawyer. The essence of the professional judgment of
the lawyer is his educated ability to relate the general body and philosophy of
law to a specific legal problem of a client; and thus, the public interest will be
better served if only lawyers are permitted to act in matters involving
professional judgment. Where this professional judgment is not involved,
non-lawyers, such as court clerks, police officers, abstracters, and many
governmental employees, may engage in occupations that require a special
knowledge of law in certain areas. But the services of a lawyer are essential in
the public interest whenever the exercise of professional legal judgment is
required.
Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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reflection.
For example, instead of the Code's categorical confidentiality
norm, 25 we should have a norm that mandates the lawyer to keep
confidentiality except to the extent disclosure is necessary to avert
substantial injustice. Justice, as I mean the term, is not an
extra-legal concept. I follow the preambles of both of the ABA
model codes in understanding justice as the most basic and
inclusive of legal norms. The term, as I use it, is more or less
synonymous with legal merit. This means that all the sources of
authority, all the analytical methods that lawyers draw on for
ambitious professional judgments and other contexts, are available
in matters of legal ethics. The values of justice and legal merit can
be made more concrete by courts and other law-making institutions
promulgating norms for government and professional practice. The
elaboration, however, should be in the manner of the common law
rather than the manner of the regulations of, say, the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration. The norms should take the form
of rebuttable presumptions and illustrative cases rather than rigid
rules.
Now, a legal ethic of complex judgment grounded ultimately in
the value of justice is not incompatible with strong loyalty to the
client. The loyalty, however, has to be to the client's rights, not just
to her interests. Loyalty to the client's rights is, I submit, what is
really being celebrated in the heroic portrayals of advocacy, such
as the Trial of Queen Caroline, although Brougham's statement
about knowing "only the client" and asserting her rights "at all
costs" is usually taken as a rhetorical banner for the mainstream or
dominant view of legal ethics. That was not what was going on in
the Trial of Queen Caroline. Brougham's threat, the news of this
devastating evidence, was based on a far more complex set of
judgments than simply that it might serve his client's interests to
disclose the King's will.
In the first place, Brougham believed that his client was factually
innocent of the acts with which she was charged. In the second
place, the secret marriage that was disclosed in the smoking gun
document was relevant to an important substantive defense. If the
King had been married previously, then his later marriage to Queen
Caroline was invalid, and she was legally incapable of adultery. In
25. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(B) (1980), which states in
pertinent part that "a lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) [rieveal a confidence or secret of his
client, (2) [ulse a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client, [and]
(3) [u]se a confidence or secret of his client for the [lawyer's] advantage." Id.
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the third place, Brougham shared the popular view that even if the
charges had been true, this extraordinary prosecution would have
been inappropriate, given the King's abusive mistreatment of his
wife throughout the marriage, including numerous infidelities on
his part. Finally, Brougham's defense was part of the Whig
parliamentary party's campaign to limit the authority of the
monarch who was wildly unpopular for what most of us would
today consider good reason.
Now, at least some of these additional factors figure strongly in
the romantic connotations of Brougham's advocacy.
Notwithstanding Brougham's description of his role, had his case
been without merit, had the devastating evidence been irrelevant,
had his defense been in the service of an ugly political cause, it
would not serve its inspiring role. Yet, none of these additional
factors are captured in Brougham's simplistic self-description,
which, on its face, might just as well apply to a lawyer threatening
to cross-examine a truthful rape complainant on her sexual history.
To say that a lawyer should seek justice is not the same thing as
saying she should work to advance whatever outcome she
unilaterally decides is just. Justice is procedural as well as
substantive. This means, for one thing, that certain procedures
should be regarded as rights in themselves and independently of
their tendency to produce just outcomes. It also means that one of
the best guarantees of a substantively just outcome is a fair
procedure. Lawyers often do not need to make, or act on,
judgments about what the right outcome is. They can rely on the
process for that. But to the extent they do, they need reasons to
believe that the process is generally fair and that their own conduct
contributes to, rather than subverts, that fairness.
An ethic of complex judgment is also fully compatible with the
adversary system. It simply requires that we treat that system as a
set of principles to be given meaning according to the context,
rather than a set of dogmatic injunctions to be applied without
regard to their purposes or consequences. To vindicate the
adversary system, the advocate needs a sense of its underlying
principles, and she needs to shape her conduct to those principles.
If her conception sees truth as the central goal of adversary
advocacy, then she should forego types of conduct that are
incompatible with that goal. Cross-examining the truthful witness,
for example, is usually ruled out.
The advocate also needs an understanding of how the system
functions as a whole. That understanding will involve a variety of
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assumptions about how the conduct of the advocate interacts with
the conduct of other role players in the system to serve the goals
of the system. But in some particular situations, these assumptions
may not apply. They may be wrong in the circumstances of the
case. And when that happens, the advocate needs to consider
whether she should adjust her conduct in order to serve the
system's goals. For example, most understandings of adversary
advocacy assume that the other side is adequately represented. In
situations where that assumption doesn't apply, fidelity to the
purposes of the system may require a more moderate style of
advocacy. The advocate is going to serve the underlying principles
of the adversary system. She may have to adjust her advocacy to
take account of the contingency that the other side is inadequately
represented and, hence, a standard adversary presentation on her
part may result in a subversion of the purposes of the system.
Now, to see such moderation as the betrayal of the adversary
system is to treat that system with a set of incantations rather than
a set of principles.
Take the problem of cross-examining the truthful witness. What
does the idea of the adversary system say about this problem? The
most plausible understanding of the adversary advocacy suggests
that its aim in the area of factual determination is to discover the
truth, and that it charges the advocates with the partisan
presentation of their clients' cases as a means to accurate
fact-finding. This understanding would rule out any general
commitment to impeaching truthful witnesses. In the classic
situation, the cross-examiner draws out information from the
witness - say, her defective eyesight - in order to encourage the
trier to draw an inference - say, that her identification of the
defendant at the scene of the crime is mistaken - that the
advocate knows is mistaken because of information she withholds
from the trier - say, that her client has told her, credibly, that she
was at the scene. The practice thus amounts to deliberate
deception, and it's difficult to see how it can make any general
contribution to accurate and factual determination.
On the other hand, there may be situations in which this
practice, while misleading with respect to specific issues,
encourages accurate determination of the ultimate issue - where,
for example, the client was at the scene but is, in fact, factually
innocent and the victim of misleading circumstantial evidence.
Note, however, that no proponent of the adversary system, at least
as I've described it, can believe that such situations occur routinely.
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For the situation supposes that the lawyer can reliably determine
that the client is innocent, but the trier cannot be relied upon to do
so after an adversary presentation conducted without deliberate
deception. Treating this situation as normal rejects the whole
premise of the adversary system, that the trier is in the best
position to determine the facts after partisan presentation of both
sides.
Nevertheless, it's important to recognize that generalizations do
have exceptions. Any theory of the adversary process will include
some assumptions that will not apply in some cases. Perhaps one
of the sides will be impaired in some way, or the trier will be
biased or incompetent or intimidated. In such circumstances, it
may be that a style of advocacy based on inapplicable
generalizations will not serve the goals of the system. If the lawyer
can reliably determine that there has been some breakdown and
can craft a response to it, she may be warranted in varying her
usual style. Impeaching a truthful witness might conceivably be an
appropriate variation. But within the context of the commitment to
the adversary system, it would be warranted only as an exceptional
response to a deviant situation.
Now, I recognize that there are other conceptions of the
adversary system other than the truth-focused one I've emphasized
here. Although I don't find these conceptions plausible, my main
purpose is not so much to defend this particular conception of the
adversary system as to use it to illustrate the style of judgment that
seems appropriate to ethical decision making; the style that - in
the words the ABA Code uses once and then ignores - "relate[s]
the general body and philosophy of the law to a specific legal
problem." 26 This involves a duty to understand the practices of
advocacy in the light of their underlying purposes and to reshape
the practices to keep them consistent with those principles in the
particular context in which the lawyer finds herself.
Now, what I'm recommending here is no more than what Ethical
Consideration 3-5 calls "the essence of [a] professional judgment."27
It's the type of judgment that lawyers routinely make in making
strategic judgments on behalf of the client. A lawyer who makes
strategic judgments routinely in the manner that the Model Rules
contemplate for many central ethical judgments would frequently
commit malpractice. Why should she make decisions about third
26.

Model Code of Professional Responsibility EC 3-5 (1980).

27.

Id.
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party and public interests differently?
If the Dominant View, the mainstream view, as an example, has
an answer to this question, it is the suggestion that the lawyer
would have difficulty maintaining the trust of the client if she
pursued an ethic requiring complex judgment. The lawyer needs
the client's confidence to do her job. She needs trust especially to
induce the client to disclose facts. There have to be some limits on
what lawyers will do for their clients, but the mainstream view
rejects limits that require complex professional judgment. Clients
are more likely to be reassured by confidentiality norms, such as
Model Rule 1.6,28 that limit disclosure to narrowly specified
situations, than by norms such as the one that would pennit
disclosure when necessary to avert a substantial injustice.
Even if lawyers could coherently implement such a norm, they
couldn't explain it to clients, the mainstream view asserts. For we
cannot impute the capacity of professional judgment to clients.
Thus, the argument goes, lawyers need to use simple judgment
because their clients do.
Now, the first thing to know about all arguments from
confidentiality is that they're myths, which means not necessarily
that they're false, but that they're based on faith rather than
rational analysis and investigation. Of course, intuition alone is
sufficient to tell us that there are some good effects from
confidentiality. We can be fairly certain that there is some
additional disclosure by clients to their lawyers because of
confidentiality.
But intuition also tells us that there are some bad effects from
confidentiality. We can be fairly certain on the basis of intuition
28. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1983), which states in full as
follows:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless
the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representatibn, and except as stated in paragraph

(b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
is necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or (2)
to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge
or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's
representation of the client.
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alone that there is considerably less disclosure by lawyers because
of confidentiality rules. And we have no basis other than faith for
believing that the good effects of confidentiality outweigh the bad
effects of confidentiality. Even in this age of interdisciplinary
research, there is not a scrap of evidence to support the behavioral
premises of the mainstream view on confidentiality. Although the
American Bar Association supports an excellent research institute,
the American Bar Foundation, to the tune of many million dollars a
year, it has never initiated any research into the empirical analysis
of its most central normative commitment.
Now, interestingly, a few adventurous academics have made
some very tentative and informal forays into the empirical
investigation of confidentiality and its behavior and consequences.
On the issue of the net benefits from confidentiality, studies have
nothing to say. But one theme that emerges, tentatively but
consistently, is that the typical lay person has little understanding
of the confidentiality law. Especially interesting is a set of
responses obtained by Fred Zacharias of the University of San
Diego that suggests that the lay understanding of confidentiality
approximates my avert injustice standard more than it does the
rules currently in force. Zacharias found that most lay people
believe that lawyers would disclose, at least in extreme cases of
injustice, such as the "Innocent Convict" scenario that I discussed
in the book,2 where breach of confidence is necessary to save a
wrongly convicted person. These responses come from the general
survey of lay people rather than clients - rather than people who
have been clients of lawyers. But Zacharias also questioned lawyers
- also raised the question as to whether represented people
actually obtained a more sophisticated understanding of
confidentiality from their lawyers. Nearly all the lawyers that he
surveyed said that they did not attempt to explain confidentiality to
their clients.30
And indeed, how could they? The bar's rule, Model Rule 1.6, is
designed to be a relatively simple rule. But that rule is subject to a
wealth of exceptions that are imposed by law outside the field of
legal ethics: the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client
privilege, the duties imposed by the civil discovery rules, the
successor doctrine in bankruptcy, and various laws that impose
29. See Simon, supra note 9, at 4 (introducing the "Innocent Convict" hypothetical,
which is then used throughout the book for illustrative purposes).
30.

See Fred Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IowA L REv. 351, 377-96 (1989).
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liability on lawyers for aiding and abetting a client's wrongdoing.
There is usually no feasible way of explaining this universe of
exceptions to the client. For example, how do you explain to a
naive client the distinction between holding confidential a client's
communication and turning over information learned from it, which
under the civil discovery rules a lawyer will often have to do?
Given the fact that clients tend not to understand the rules and
lawyers tend not to make serious efforts to enlighten them, it's not
at all clear that the non-radical revision of the scope of
confidentiality and any amount of change in the form of the
confidentiality rule would have a large impact on client disclosure
practices, except perhaps among the most sophisticated clients.
And for them, the reassurance of strong confidentiality guarantees
seem least needed anyway. Even if we want to increase client
understanding of the rules, the current regime is no easier to
explain than would be a contextual confidentiality. Despite the
deceptive simplicity of Rule 1.6, the current regime is, in fact, quite
technical.
One of the attractive things about the idea of justice is that most
lay people have some notion of what it means. It's not always the
same notion of what it means. But this concept then will often be
more accessible to them, easier to explain to them, an easier basis
for a discussion with them, than the technical conditions to which
the dominant rule depends. The contextual approach has the
advantage of focusing discussion around a term - justice - that
unfortunately plays a stronger role in lay ethical discussion than it
does in lawyers'.
People who grant that lawyers are capable of complex judgment
sometimes doubt, even so, that we can institutionalize such an
effort in the form of a disciplinary regime. They wonder if courts
and agencies can make coherent, consistent rulings under a
contextual approach. They doubt whether there's any way under
such an approach to give lawyers notice or guidance of what's
expected of them. In fact, however, lawyers are already subject to
a variety of rules that take the form of contextual standards
requiring difficult judgment. If we leave aside lawyer duties to
non-clients - if we leave lawyer duties to non-clients to relatively
black letter rules, we continue to prescribe the most important
duty to the clients, the duty of care, to contextual standards.
We've noted that the malpractice regime is a quintessentially
contextual standard. Moreover, if you look beyond the Model Rules
and the professional disciplinary regimes to the way recent
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developments in other laws have impacted the law of lawyering,
you see a different picture. The most important developments
affecting the lawyer's duties to non-clients come from the courts,
not in their role as promulgators of disciplinary rules, but rather in
their roles as common law adjudicators, as promulgators of general
procedural rules, and from administrative agencies like the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Office of Thrift
Supervision.
Consider what may be the two most important recent
developments of this sort. First, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Rule 11 now requires that litigation tactics have a
proper purpose and a reasonable basis, and Rule 26(a), as recently
amended, requires that evidentiary material relevant to disputed
issues be volunteered to the other side. These strengthened lawyer
duties to non-clients do not take the form of bright-line rules, but
require complex and contextual judgment.
Second, we have the efforts of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Office of Thrift Supervision to subject lawyers
to discipline for assisting client violations of the securities and the
banking laws. These agencies are acting under statutes that
basically incorporate variations on the common law of fraud and
misrepresentation. These common law norms have been around for
centuries. The securities and banking laws that incorporate them
have been around for more than a half century. What's new is that
these laws are being applied in ways that impinge on professional
responsibility doctrine. Of course, the development is resistant with
the traditional arguments against requiring norms of complex
judgment in this field. But lawyers have been charging their clients
quite a bit of money for many decades for advising them how to
conform their conduct to these norms. So it doesn't seem that
much to expect that they could, in fact, apply it to their own
conduct.
How does a contextual regime fit with the practical pressures of
the marketplace for legal services? We worry about the race to the
bottom. Lawyers who recognize more than minimal duties to
non-clients may have difficulty regularly attracting clients. Clients,
the argument goes, will prefer the lawyer willing to push their
interests most aggressively, and a lawyer who's identified with an
ethic more responsive to non-clients will suffer competitively.
Now, this problem does not arise strictly from the contextual
quality of ethical norms. It arises from the greater deference to
non-client interests in an ethic focused around the value of justice
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ultimately. If we assume, however, that a contextual ethic gives
lawyers more room to make their judgments without fear of
discipline, then it contributes to the race to the bottom problem, at
least it was conceived in the mainstream argument. If lawyers have
a range of discretion, the pressures of the marketplace will erode
that discretion and put those most concerned about non-client
interests at a disadvantage. That's the argument.
This argument deserves to be taken seriously to the extent that
it's right, to the extent that its premises are correct. It's perfectly
appropriate to demand that professional responsibility norms take
account of the practical pressures that lawyers take, including the
pressures to make a living. But the objection over-simplifies the
economic situation.
If there are economic pressures to intensify pro-client zeal, there
are also countervailing pressures that intensify commitments to the
public and non-client. Pushing client interests aggressively against
the competing interests of others is only one of the things that
lawyers do. Few lawyers spend most of their time doing anything
that fits this description. Another important function of lawyers is
to induce third parties - state officials, potential deal partners to rely on or collaborate with their clients. A lawyer who can
convince such third parties that she is committed to respecting
their rights should have an advantage in this task. A lawyer who
subscribes to an ethic of justice or legal merit should have an
advantage here. And if she has an advantage in inducing third
parties to rely on or collaborate with her clients, she should have
an advantage of attracting clients who would benefit from this kind
of assistance. Economics is a constraint, but not as severe a one as
people sometimes assume.
Another problem people worry about has to do with the role of
established disciplinary regime. Even if we concede that the
contextual approach could be incorporated with a disciplinary
regime, if we could imagine, the prevailing regime is much
different. Is the contextual approach of any use to a lawyer who
has to practice within the constraints of the current regime? The
prevailing regime does impose important restraints. Most notably, it
forbids disclosure in a lot of situations in which many would say
that justice requires disclosure. In an extreme case, say, in the
Innocent Convict case, in which an innocent life may depend on
the disclosure, many lawyers would disclose in violation of the
rules, as Zacharias' study found. But lawyers will often feel
constrained by the rules, both because the rules are backed by
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sanctions and because they are promulgated by the courts, which
have authority to regulate the bar.
But just as it's important not to overestimate the constraints of
economics, we shouldn't overestimate the constraints of the
existing disciplinary regime. That regime is based on very different
principles from the contextual approach that I argue for. But a
regime that left lawyers no ethical autonomy at all would be
intolerable. So the Model Rules do leave vast areas unregulated.
Perhaps the most important of these relatively unregulated areas is
withdrawal. Under the Model Rules, lawyers can withdraw from a
representation for almost any reason. 31 In many situations, this is a
powerful lever; the threat of withdrawal will sometimes induce
clients to acquiesce in tactical or disclosure decisions they might
otherwise disfavor.
Curiously, the Model Rules provide almost no limits on the
lawyer's ability to impose her will to this lever. If some of the rules,
like the confidentiality rules, seem to constrain lawyer judgment
too rigidly, the one on withdrawal doesn't constrain it enough. But
this gap in the Model Rules gives an important measure of
discretion to the ethically ambitious lawyer who would try to do
better than the rules without violating them. She can use the
discretion of the contextual she can use the contextual
approach to ethics to structure the discretion that the rules give
her over the withdrawal, for example. Even when the rules would
permit it, she ought not to withdraw or threaten withdrawal when
that would be unjust to the client. But she should feel free to use
this discretion to prevent the client from doing injustice to others.
So, here's what you should tell Clyde about the bank robbery.
You won't help him because his project is unjust. You know this
not because Section 477 spells this out unambiguously, but because
31. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(b) (1983), which states in
pertinent part as follows:
[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if withdrawal can be
accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, or if: (1)
the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services that the lawyer
reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent; (2) the client has used the lawyer's
services to perpetrate a crime or fraud; (3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective
that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent; (4) the client fails substantially to
fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and has been given
reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled; (5)
the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer or
has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or (6) other good cause for
withdrawal exists.
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you have determined that it would be inconsistent with the
principles that underlie that section and a variety of other sources
that you are aware of. The state's burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt or the presumption of innocence is not a
principle that's relevant to a decision of whether to engage in
unjust conduct. Even easy cases like this one sometimes turn out
to rest on relatively more complex judgments than what initially
appears.
But conventional legal ethics generally discourages us from
treating as complex the issues without the relatively obvious
answers of the kind involved in the bank robbery. It encourages us
to adopt more routine approaches to these problems.
So at worst, as in the Multistate Professional Responsibility
Exam, we find a conception of "thinking like a lawyer" that doesn't
involve any thinking at all. At best, as in the Model Rules, we find
- or the more ambitious of the Model Rules - we find a
conception that tries to make particular ethical judgments as
simple and categorical as possible. Yet outside the sphere of legal
ethics, most admiring and ambitious accounts of lawyering
associate the profession with complex and contextual judgment,
and portray this kind of judgment as a hallmark of the attractive
roles of lawyering. I propose we try to connect the field of legal
ethics to this tradition.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR TAYLOR: Thank you, Bill. Because I introduced the panel
from that side, I'll ask that you respond in that order. And the
respondents may feel free to go to the podium if they wish. I'll give
you five minutes and I'll rattle this bell.
PROFESSOR LEDEWITZ: And I will ignore it. Professor Simon's book is
a needed, challenging response to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, but I am not going to waste my response time praising it.
So simply take that into account.
Doing justice is the heart of this book. Professor Simon is trying
to teach us how to practice justice as lawyers. The practice of
justice is the ethical life for the lawyer. Professor Simon argues
that justice requires contextual thinking rather than obedience to
categorical rules. I do not think that he shows this convincingly in
the book. After all, the confidentiality exception of Rule 1.6(b) that
he referred to today is contextual now. It says the lawyer may
reveal information under certain circumstances.
It would be better if this exception were categorically stated to
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require disclosure in clear cases, as I'm sure he would agree. But
the more fundamental problem with Professor Simon's commitment
to contextual thinking is that it is not clear that contextual
judgment, as he understands it, will lead to ethical judgment.
Chapter Six is where we learned how to make ethical judgments.
The high point of this chapter for me is the difference explained
between tax avoidance by the rich and welfare cheating, called
maximization by the author, by the poor.32 The ethical lawyer is to
aid the poor person but not the rich one in the avoidance scheme.
But how could such a distinction between rich and poor be
justified? Obviously one could consider the place of the poor in a
capitalist society, but this is not done in the book. Doing that,
taking account of the social, the economic, and the political
conditions, is prohibited by the insistence at the beginning of
Chapter Six that contextual thinking is "not ordinary morality."
Indeed, it is not any sort of morality. Contextual thinking is
presented as a type of reasoning from legal sources and norms. But
looking only at such legal sources, there is nothing in the book, nor
could there be, to justify treating the rich cheater any differently
than the poor one.
Professor Simon writes that the lawyer might decide that the
claimant's interest in a minimally adequate income is a value of
exceptional legal importance. This is an example of the tendency in
the book to couch conclusions in unassailable indeterminacy. Yes, a
lawyer might reach such a conclusion, but it would be wholly
unconvincing. There is in law as much support for paying as little
taxes as possible as there is for providing a fair income for the
poor. The interest of the poor in a decent income is compelling, but
it is so in a moral sense, not a legal one. The point here is not a
quibble about words. Professor Simon writes this way - putting
morality at bay while emphasizing the legal in order to provide
cover to idealistic students, lawyers, and professors who want to
do good in the world but who are afraid of being accused of doing
morality.
Professor Simon is haunted by the claim, which he endorses by
his very fear of it, that moral claims are subjective and inferior to
those of law. He knows that in making legal claims, he can avoid
the issue of truth, and this explains his tendency to the
indeterminacy of "may" and "might." Legal judgments do not claim
32. See Simon, supra note
hypotheticals).

9,

at 138,

142-49

(comparing two

tax avoidance
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to be true, only to be plausible defenses of particular positions.
What Professor Simon shows by his commitment to a poor client
without reflection is that legal arguments of this sort serve
pre-existing commitments, which are themselves never examined.
Professor Simon's other argument in the book is thought by him
to be a kind of antidote to the first. He limits contextual judgment
to law, but he says that law is a substantively moral order.
Professor Simon says at the beginning of the book: "Justice, as I
use the term, is not an extralegal concept."3
Professor Simon's commitment to the relation between law and
morality is a very extreme one. He writes: "If we define law
substantively, we erase the line between law and morals." This
extreme claim of erasure goes against the nuanced reasoning of
Lon Fuller, against the nuanced reasoning of Harry Jaffa, and that
of the entire natural law tradition. But ironically, this extreme
moral claim does not elevate moral reasoning in law. As Chapter
Six demonstrates, this extreme position banishes moral reasoning
from the critique of the legal realm. That is precisely the charge
that H.L.A. Hart made against Lon Fuller and natural law.
According to Professor Simon, if I commit perjury to save my
client from the death penalty, I am not violating legal ethics if I
believe the death penalty to be unconstitutional. But, in fact, I do
not commit this perjury because the death penalty is
unconstitutional, but because the death penalty is morally wrong. I
suppose there is a sense in which the pro-life demonstrator
sitting-in at the abortion clinic is upholding the law, but it would
require serious reflection to explain what that means.
Professor Simon subsumes all this under the rubric "creative
aspects of interpretation" and then leaves the matter. There are
issues here that are being assumed away. It is important to
Professor Simon to be able to say that law is moral and, therefore,
all moral decisions are legal ones. The effect is to avoid moral
reflection - in the case of the protester: is the unborn child
worthy of protection? - and to focus instead on a legal issue: was
Roe v. WadeM rightly or wrongly decided?
Roberto Unger teaches us that the task of the lawyer is to find
the fundamental issues in the debates of the professions and to
bring these issues back, transformed, to the larger life of society.
What Professor Simon has done is the opposite. By subsuming
33.

Id. at 9.

34.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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morality in law, he has unwittingly, and with the best of intention,
done what lawyers have a tendency to do: He has taken important
issues away from society into the arcane debates of the profession
and has there hidden them.
PROFESSOR TAYLOR:

Professor Krasik?

believe that Professor Simon's book accurately
describes the kind of post modern angst that lawyers feel now in
terms of their relationship to their profession. Zealous advocacy
within the bounds of law has turned out to be a very unsatisfying
version of what we do and of our view of professional
responsibility. We're not persuaded that, in the long run, justice is
done, and we engage in routine manipulation of legal rules as
PROFESSOR KRASIK I

zealots in the service of clients. We cynically react to becoming
economically entrapped in a professional and intellectual life that
we find unsatisfying.
The other point that I think is important that is not necessarily
brought out adequately in Professor Simon's book is the fact that
the public, the citizenry themselves, are equally disenchanted and
cynical about our profession. And a fundamental question we have
to ask is this: Is the law in the service of the profession? Do we act
as servants of the law, the profession, or the citizenry when we
act as lawyers?
The public is not generally convinced of the social efficacy of
what we do. The public is cynical and knows that "this is the way
things operate," and "if I get involved in the legal system, I will
have to hire a lawyer because that's what people do and that's how
we work the system." But what we often hear after the verdict in a
high profile trial, when TV reporters interview people who are
interested or supporters of the litigants, is that the verdict winners,
or supporters of verdict winners, always say, "Well, this time the
system worked." Losers always say, "This time the system didn't
work."
I think the public generally feels that justice in the long run is
not being done. And so, the question that I have is how the
approach that Professor Simon puts forth in this book responds to
the need to involve the public, the citizenry, and make a
connection with them in terms of defining what our professional
responsibilities, what our legal ethics are.
In some way, we should explicitly connect to and involve the
public and the needs of the community in what we do. But I do not
have an adequate answer from Professor Simon's book as to how
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this can be accomplished through the adoption of a contextual
approach to ethics, or through the continuation of a system of
professional responsibility that depends on professional regulation
by a cadre of supposed experts, i.e., the lawyers.
So, with regard to these concerns, I would say that unless we
can make some connection to the public, to the citizenry, who
arguably are to be served by the law, all we are doing in
articulating professional ethics is allowing us, the lawyers, to
reconcile our ambitions with our anxieties. We're doing nothing to
speak to the public's anxiety about our profession.
The contextual decision-making ideal in regard to ethical
dilemmas proposes that the lawyer take into account all the
individual circumstances of a particular case and act in such a
manner as to promote justice, defined as involving the legal merits
of the case. My understanding of the definition of "the legal merits
of the case" tells me that this is so constricted a definition of
justice that there is no possibility for fundamental change in the
profession.
As I understand legal merits and a contextual approach to the
legal merits, the lawyer can take a more independent and
free-ranging look at all the interests and objectives behind the legal
principles that are involved in the case in front of her. To a certain
extent, she contextualizes or individualizes because she's
committed to reweigh or reassess the weight to be given to the
particular interest in a given case.
But at every turn, the potential range of interests has already
been defined by entrenched legal rules. Thus working in, and
fighting in, a closed system allows the lawyer herself to be
empowered, but does not offer any possibility of change to the
citizenry or to the people who are affected.
In essence, the approach of professional regulation of legal ethics
within a Dominant View or a Contextual View is anti-democratic,
because it really has resided the power to determine the
professional responsibility of lawyers in a cadre of - let's call it a
cadre of so-called experts who are not receptive or open to input
from outside the profession. If clients in fact are not as concerned
about confidentiality as much as the Model Rules propose that they
are, why don't we know this? Why don't we know? Or do we have
to depend on empirical research by the American Bar Foundation
to let us know what clients value? And if we don't know these
things, how can we know them? What fundamental changes can we
make in the regulation of the profession to ensure that we reflect
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the values and the ethics of the people that we serve?
Thank you.
PROFESSOR TAYLOR:

Father Kealy?

FATHER KEALY: To be honest with you, the longer I'm listening, I'm
not quite sure what I'm doing here. I got a letter from Bob [Taylor],
and it started off: "As one Irishman to another." And then, as I
began to think this morning, I presume what he meant was, he
knows I come from a society where sheep stealing was always an
honorable profession.
And he knows, I think very well, that I don't believe in justice of
any shape or size, to be quite honest with you. I was full of
affirmation as I struggled through this book. I always recommend
students to read books that they find very difficult. But at the same
time, I suspect I would totally disagree with it from beginning to
end, particularly because of the absence of God in the book.
You may not realize this, but God, they say, is making a
come-back in theology, believe it or not.
And I found there was a great scene there with Kafka's The
Trial,35 the parable of the door. And that has remained with me,
and I thank you very much for that, and also for that extraordinary
George Eliot, who translated one of the most notorious books of
the 19th century in my business [referring to David Strauss' Life of
Christ].36
But some time ago, a friend of mine, and I feel exactly the same,
was asked to do a wedding for the chief justice's daughter. When
he came out on the altar, and all the judiciary were there, he began
by saying, "I just consulted my lawyer on the way in. And he said
it's all right to say 'the Lord be with you,' provided you say it
without prejudice!"
But I must admit I'm very prejudiced here.
Let me tell you my favorite law story just to give you my picture.
It comes from New York, the former mayor, Fiorello La GuardiaHe used to occasionally preside in court. And once during the
Depression years, an unemployed man was brought before him for
stealing bread for his family. La Guardia said, "Sir, I'm sorry, the
law exempts no one; I sentence you to a $10 fine." Then Fiorello
opened - this is the judge - he actually opened his own wallet,

35. See Simon, supra note 9, at 115-18 (summarizing the Parable of the Doorkeeper
from FtANz KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Vintage ed. 1969)).
36.

See id. at 121-25.
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believe it or not, and he gave the man $10, remitted the fine, and
levied a fine for the man on everybody in the courtroom, because,
he said, "It's a disgrace that a man in this city has to steal to feed
his family." In a sense, that's how I see law.
I was thinking very much, to be honest, as I went through this
book, that once I chaired a debate on law in Nairobi in East Africa.
There were three deans speaking. One was from Holland, the other
was from Cambridge, England, and the third one was from
America. He wasn't from Stanford, you'll be glad to know. But it
was Nebraska or somewhere.
And they wanted me to summarize at the end, and I didn't know
what to say, to be honest. But I concluded that really the
Cambridge man would get the prize for the best speech, definitely.
The eloquence was wonderful, that wonderful British genius for
understatement, which gives you the impression he might be telling
the truth.
The second man, the dean from Holland, really knew the law,
and he explained it very clearly. There was no obfuscation; blunt
and straight and to the point.
But I said, if I was in trouble, I definitely would want the
Nebraskan, because he would confuse any jury or any judge, and
he was the one to get you off, whatever the ethics of the case. But
believe it or not, that's something I found myself thinking at this
point and I hope that I at least made you laugh a little.
. However, I often find myself talking on the law in church. It's
very important to note that the first books of the Bible are called
"the Law." You know, the Jewish people had 613 laws, that's what
they counted. I used to think that was an enormous amount of law
before I came home to Ireland and I saw the European Community
has a book that thick [gesturing] of laws for the production of
eggs. And then I came to America, and really, it's certainly the most
legislated society ever. There are more laws in this country than all
other countries I suspect in history put together. There are more of
them here, just including those on taxes. The basic notion seems to
be that one canalegislate goodness.
The Jewish people had 365 negative laws out of the 613. One law
for every day was their idea. And the second type of law that they
had was 248 positive ones. These were for every part of the body.
This was their idea of all-embracing law. It was all-embracing. And
the question asked on many a Sunday is, which is the most
important law? And this is what I was looking for in the book.
I should add that my other source of law, other than this very
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profound book, is John Grisham. He's my favorite. I did note that,
in all the references that you made, there was no reference to my
friend John Grisham. Recently I read a study on him, and it did
suggest that the reason we like John Grisham is that we all deep
down have a desire for vengeance, to get even. And what I saw
was that that's the kind of God that is at the basis of most of
modem law. It's the old idea the eye for the eye, or to be fair to
Jewish law, only an eye for an eye, and only a tooth for a tooth.
That's the old law.
And so, as I looked into this, I thought to myself, what kind of
God do you think is behind this law, this society? That would be
my first question. And secondly, what is the greatest commandment
of this law that you're proposing?
And as you know, the answer in the gospel was that it's like a
door; law is like a door. You need two hinges for proper law to
float or to fulfill its function. First one is the kind of God you
believe. That's the heart of it. And it could be a very poor God, and
I think it is, for most people in society.
And the second kind of law, which is the more peculiar one, it's
from the book of the Bible, as you know, that's quoted on the
Liberty Bell here in the United States, quoting from the book that
gave us "love your neighbor as yourself."
So basically, it's the idea of compassion that should be at the
heart of any good law book. That is the Biblical view, that the
center of good law is compassion. That means - the Greek word
is sympathia, and the Latin word is compassion. It means to suffer
with people, to feel with people, to walk in their moccasins, as the
Indians say.
And so I wonder how much compassion's got to do with this
theory that's being advanced, with this view of God? These are the
two questions that I would like to pose.
Thank you very much, Professor, for making me think. Thank
you very much.
PROFESSOR TAYLOR: We're not going to ask Professor Simon to
respond to himself. Dean Cafardi?
DEAN CAFARDI: Thank you, Father Kealy. I think you've shown that
the British gift for understatement is matched only by the Irish gift
for story telling.
Alcoholism, drug addiction, mental health problems are
afflictions that affect a great number of professions, including
lawyers and judges. Reports of the ABA now estimate that while
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ten percent of the general population have problems with drug and
alcohol abuse, that number is around eighteen percent for lawyers,
almost double the national average.
Because many lawyers and judges are over-achievers who carry
enormous workloads, the tendency to escape from the daily
problems through the use of drugs and alcohol is regrettably
present in our legal community, and also the daily pressures placed
on these men and women can lead to enormous amounts of stress
and mental illness. Recent studies suggested a majority of
disciplinary problems involve either chemical dependency or
emotional stress.
How has this happened to us? How has one out of five
practitioners of our noble profession fallen so low, and what can
we do to change it? I think the answer is in how we practice law
and the ethics of lawyering. Not necessarily what the Code or the
Rules of Professional Responsibility say, but in how we are
lawyers. I'm intrigued by Professor Simon's book. There's a certain
primeval appeal in the Dominant View: "all the lawyering the law
will allow." There's something I like about that. The downside of
that view: the lawyer is a morally neutral hired gun; which far
exceeds, I think, the upside.
The Contextual View I think makes a lot more sense. But the
part of Professor Simon's book that I really like the most was his
idea in Chapter Five of meaningful work as a grounding for legal
professionalism, as a source of lawyers' ethics. This approach to
the ethics of lawyering has the potential to cure many of the ills
that face our profession. Like any proposed cure, it will first
require laboratory and clinical trials. But early indications are that
this remedy has definite possibilities. And it's really quite simple,
while it looks not so simple as to seem trite.
Simply put, this is the cure: If all we do is use our professional
training, our law degrees, to advance ourselves, albeit using the
causes of our clients do so, that model is so confining that it will
be difficult if not impossible to find either contentment or
happiness within it. I suspect that most if not all of our drug- and
alcohol-addicted colleagues had their problems start here. In the
final analysis, they were lawyers only for themselves.
On the other hand, if we use our law degrees truly to benefit
others, if we take up their burdens, if we bear their troubles, if we
solve their problems, the effectiveness on our practices and on our
personalities will be remarkable. All of a sudden, things open up.
Now, by focusing beyond ourselves, we find the happiest
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professional grounding within ourselves. As Professor Simon
quoted, "Life in all its fullest will provide the answers." It does
sound simple, but in reality, this medicine is hard to take, because
there will always be loans to pay off, mouths to feed, children to
clothe and educate, elderly parents to take care of, and that will
take money, and money comes from work. As encompassing as
these demands might be, they do not and should not require all of
our professional lives. This way of practicing law, by focusing on a
public and on a purely private benefit, will also ground us. It will
make ethics, doing the right thing without even .thinking about it,
second nature.
And I like to think there's a distinct Duquesne aspect to all of
this, too. The practice of law to benefit not ourselves, but others, is
what we do. The motto on our school's coat of arms is from
Cicero, but it really states a very Catholic idea, Salus Populi
Suprema Lex: "the people's welfare is the highest law." The
purpose of law is not personal advancement or even necessarily
the advancement of our clients, but rather the Salus Populi, the
common good.
In his treatise on law, St. Thomas Aquinas defines this as the
very purpose of law, an ordinance of 'eason promulgated by the
proper authority to achieve the common good. It was no accident
that the very first clinic that we started here at Duquesne Law
School was the Economic and Community Development Law
Clinic, whose sole purpose was to provide free legal services to the
community-based public charities, at the same time providing
real-life practice opportunities for our students. This is the kind of
learning we want to encourage at Duquesne, to provide legal
services, where the intention and only goal is to help others; to
make people's lives better; to provide a public benefit; and certainly
lawyering that seeks the Salus Populi, the common good, does
that.
And as Professor Simon indicates in his book, this type of
meaningful work can be a real grounding for legal professionals in
all aspects of our practice. It is also, I think, a great cure for
depression.
PROFESSOR TAYLOR: Attorney Henderson?
MR. HENDERSON: I guess Fve been struck by a lot of things today. I
suppose the first reaction that I had is that this is about as hard an
edge of peer review as anybody's experienced, Professor Simon.
In that context, though, I was assured by Professor Taylor that
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even though I may have been the sponsor of this, or the genesis of
it, that I was in no way curbed by my high level of disagreement
because of what I've read, thought through, and experienced; and I
was assured by Professor Taylor, as was confirmed by the previous
speakers, that the level of agreement may well be fleeting.
Nevertheless, I was impressed by the well thought out and well
developed notions that Professor Simon has advanced. In fact, I'm
delighted that all of us have been able to experience this
opportunity and I am looking forward to more of the same in the
future.
The first comment that I have - and I want to make sure, as
others have done, that I speak clearly - is that although Professor
Simon did mention it somewhat more in his oral presentation, I'm
left with the thought of the absence of the client in the process of
reading the book. And so I have this to offer - notwithstanding
anything that Professor Simon suggests to the contrary, the role of
the lawyer is the representation of the client, most significantly in
the resolution of disputes.
As I read Professor Simon's book, and to a large extent this also
applies to the symposium of the Stanford Law Review, 37 which I
had the privilege of having gone through - thanks again to
Professor Taylor - I was struck by the lack of any significant
reference to the client. For example, what does the client think or
feel about, or how the client might react to these notions by
Professor Simon? And my conclusion, based upon my experience,
was that the reaction of the client would be overwhelmingly
negative.
The idea of trying to separate the client's right and the client's
interest just seems to me to be unworkable, at least from the
standpoint of the client, because those two notions are interwoven,
intertwined and, in effect, one, as far as the client is concerned.
The second concept was that because of the lawyer's duties of
loyalty and to provide what I call "single-minded unconflicted
37. In April of 1999, the Stanford Law Review published a Review Essay Symposium
on The Practice of Justice. See Deborah L. Rhode, Symposium Introduction: In Pursuit of
Justice, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 867 (1999); David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51
STAN. L REV. 873 (1999); Thomas L. Shaffer, Should a ChristianLawyer Sign Up for Simon's
Practice of Justice?, 51 STAN. L REV. 903 (1999); Robert W. Gordon, The Radical
Conservatism of the Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L REv. 919 (1999); Anthony V. Alfieri,
(Er)Race-ing an Ethic of Justice, 51 STAN. L REV. 935 (1999); Tanina Rostain, Waking Up
from Uneasy Dreams: Professional Context, Discretionary Judgment, and the Practice of
Justice, 51 STAN. L REV. 955 (1999); and Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a
Less than Ideal World, 51 STAN. L REv. 973 (1999).
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representation," it occurred to me that Professor Simon's notions
were largely unworkable. And I reached that conclusion before I
had read some of the criticisms or some of the comments by,
particularly, Professor Gordon and Professor Rostain.38
Next, I suggest that we as lawyers - and this is in response to, I
think, something that maybe Professor Krasik alluded to - have
not failed because we, as Professor Simon puts it, constantly
disappoint the aspirations that the law encourages, but rather we
have not adequately established or defined appropriate
expectations of the lawyer to the public. While the client has a
clear appreciation of the lawyer's duties to the client, in the context
of the adversary system, we've failed in not adequately informing
the so-called public of the proper bounds of the lawyer-client
relationship within the process in which it operates.
The last point is that difficult legal ethics problems do not
typically center on revealing client confidences. My experience,
even as a very young lawyer, when about to say some things about
any particular un-named client, has been that I quickly feel uneasy.
And that squeamish feeling that I had about nearly revealing the
client's confidence is very recognizable; therefore, the very
important ethical duty of confidentiality has not been a difficult
issue of legal ethics for me.
We always have to be on the lookout for that squeamish feeling,
but my experience has been that the truly difficult issues of legal
ethics frequently come up in the area of unconflicted
representation. One such example is the Georgine 9 case that I
38. See Gordon, supra note 37; Rostain, supra note 37.
39. This case concerned the legitimacy under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure of a class-action certification that was sought in order to achieve a global
settlement of current and future asbestos-related claims. The proposed class would have
included potentially millions of individuals who had either been occupationally exposed to
asbestos attributable to the defendant, or who were a spouse or close family member of
someone else so exposed. The proposed class settlement agreement would have precluded
nearly all class members from litigating claims not previously filed against the defendants.
The district court approved the settling parties' plan for giving notice to the class and
certified the proposed class for settlement only. The Third Circuit ultimately vacated the
district court's orders. See Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F3d 610 (3rd Cir. 1996).
The circuit court acknowledged that a class action may be certified for settlement only, but
held that the certification requirements of Rule 23 must be met as if the case were going to
be litigated, without taLking the settlement into account, explaining that certification was
inappropriate because the class failed to satisfy, among other provisions, Rule 23(b)(3)'s
requirement that questions common to the class "predominate over" other questions, and
Rule 23(a)(4)'s adequacy of representation requirement. Georgine, 83 E3d 610. The court
therefore ordered the class decertified. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed. See Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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alluded to in Professor Taylor's class last year, a case that I was
involved in, which involved a very significant and very contentious
ethics question, where we had Professors Cramton and Koniak on
our side and Professor Hazard and an ethicist from South Carolina
on the other, and how those were handled in the context of a
fairness hearing before a District Judge in Philadelphia, and how
later the Third Circuit and still later the Supreme Court handled
these issues, were telling. And these require - these issues often
require complex contextual judgment. And the lawyers' capacity to
distinguish between reaching a proper versus an improper
judgment seems to me to be clearly premised on the Code of
ProfessionalResponsibility.
And as we somehow move into an area that becomes even less
clear and fuzzier and proceeding down this slippery slope of
contextual judgment, I'm not sure how it will work ultimately; I'm
fearful that it may bottom out so that the ethical judgments that we
make become more problematic and create more turmoil than
solutions.
Thank you.
PROFESSOR TAYLOR: Judge Folino?

JUDGE FOLINO: The one comment I have is that under the Contextual
View that Professor Simon writes about, zealous advocacy within
the bounds of the law is not something that lawyers should always
do in an extreme way. And I can tell you that the best lawyers,
even under the current Dominant View, don't always practice that
way.
So, for example, a lawyer doesn't always raise an impediment to
every discovery request. You don't look for every possible
procedural obstacle to put up in front of your adversary. And I
bring this up because I was recently at a seminar where lawyers
told me about the dissatisfaction they had with the profession. I
didn't get a chance to pursue it, but one of the things they said was
it was that this sort of thing, and it was the young lawyers that
made the profession not as much fun for them as it used to be. So
I wish I could have pursued that further, but I think maybe that's
what they were talking about, the raising up of all sorts of
procedural obstacles and technical obstacles to the trial, instead of
just getting to the merits of justice.
The second comment I have is that I'm a trial judge and I try
cases just about every day. I'll try maybe forty cases a year in the
civil division. And I've never seen injustice done by a jury yet
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under the current scheme that we practice under now. So at least
I'm happy for that. I'm sure there are some cases where injustice
does occur, but I haven't seen it, and I'm happy for that.
Those are my two comments. Then I had a couple questions for
the professor and I hope you'll be able to respond to them. One
thing I was struck with was this: if a lawyer, in practicing law, can
and should look out for the interests of others, the third parties,
while he's representing the client, could he also represent both
sides in a dispute? Because if you can look out for the interest of
third parties, couldn't you look out for the interest of the other
party? And in fact, isn't that what you're suggesting that lawyers
do? One such example in the book - it would be unethical for the
lawyer to raise the statute of limitations defense if your client had
already told you that they really do owe the debt, even though it
was a long time ago. 40 So there you're looking out for the other
side, so maybe under the Contextual View, the lawyer can
represent both sides to a dispute. I wondered how that would work
out.
The other question I have is this: that if this view, the Contextual
View, would make the lawyer's job more fulfilling, and that's part of
the reason why you propose it, why is it that lawyers are resisting
it so vigorously? In other words, I'm not suggesting that practicing
under the Contextual View would not make a lawyer's job more
fulfilling, but I'm curious as to why so many lawyers resist your
ideas. I do want to know that.
PROFESSOR

TAYLOR: Thank you very much. Bill, if you would

respond?
PROFESSOR SIMON:

Well, you know, my friend Johnny Iligous, a

constitutional law scholar, once came back from a conference and
he said he felt like he was the most disagreed with man in the
building.
Which is, you know, better than not being taken seriously,
believe me. And I'm not even sure, it might be better than being
agreed with. It's certainly more interesting than being agreed with.
But I'm certainly grateful to be taken seriously. It's really an honor
to have so much attention, serious attention, thoughtful attention,
paid by so many distinguished people to the book.
So let me just respond to one large point and then more briefly

40. See Simon, supra note 9, at 29 (introducing the "Statute of Limitations"
hypothetical, which is then used throughout the book for illustrative purposes).
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to three or four other points. But I think the dominant theme of
certainly the first three respondents - Professor Ledewitz and
Professor Krasik and Father Kealy - is what I'm always going to
think of as the Duquesne Critique, which is that I subsume the
language of morality into the language of law. The critique is that
I'm reluctant to use, and Bruce [Ledewitz] even said fearful and
insecure with, the language of morality.
Now, I think that's a valid critique, although I think [Professor
Ledewitz] has the motivation wrong. It's not that I'm fearful of it.
It's not that I don't have any confidence about that language. It's
that I'm envisioning another conversation, and it's in addition to the
one, I think, that the Duquesne Critique focuses on. I'm envisioning
a conversation that takes place across a broad range of the society;
but, first of all, a broad range of the legal profession, and then of
society itself. And the reason I want to frame it in legal terms, and
understand I have a very expansive understanding of legal terms,
but the reason I want to frame it in legal terms is that law is the
public language of American society. It's not a language of the legal
profession, but it's the public language of American society. And it
seems to me it's the language that makes possible the most general
discussion, the discussion across the greatest number of
differences in the society.
Now, that doesn't mean that aren't a lot of other rich
conversations that will go on in the language of morality or
religion, for example, but it seems to me that the language of
morality and religion limits the range of people that can participate
in the conversation, potentially, more than the language of law. So I
want to emphasize the possibility of a rich discussion even though
it's not the only discussion that should take place, and maybe even
not the most important discussion that should take place. I want to
emphasize the possibility of legal rhetoric as, in fact, a basis, like a
set of tools, a set of sources of authority, a set of loads of analyses,
that make possible a broader conversation, potentially.
Now, you know, I don't think it's an accident that this critique is
raised in a Catholic law school, and I think one of the reasons that
I think people are quicker to raise it here than they are elsewhere,
is that the moral and religious conversation that can be had by
many people here is a much richer one than many other Americans
can have, privately, in terms of moral and religious terms. That is,
secular Americans can't have the religious conversation at all. The
moral discourse, the tools of analysis, the rhetoric that is available
for moral discussion, it seems to me, for a lot of people, is much
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more impoverished than the rhetoric that's available for any
discussions in terms of law and the public value.
So I don't want to displace in any way the moral conversations
that can go on, but I just want to suggest that whatever value they
have here, they have an even greater importance in places in which
the resources for these other conversations are not as great as they
are here.
Now, Father Kealy, you know, by the way, I actually have a
paper about John Grisham's jurisprudence and its relation to legal
ethics. And an argument as to why his novels completely support
my approach.
But let me respond to - I relay the points that Father Kealy and
Professor Krasik raised. Professor Krasik raised this issue about
the - no, I'm thinking about Mr. Henderson - Professor Krasik
talked about the public, and Mr. Henderson talked about the
client's right. Professor Krasik said, "Where is the public in all of
this?" And Mr. Henderson said that he didn't think that the
presence of the client was as high profile as it should be.
I think both of those are correct. On the other hand, I don't think
that there are real problems with my argument. I think there's
incompleteness in my argument, but not a deficiency in the
argument. If you think that the public should be active in the
regulation of the profession, and by the way I agree in principle,
then, it seems to me, that you should design institutions of
professional regulation or you should involve your legislature, and
request lots of public participation. But then it seems to me, the
question is what form is the output of these institutions going to
take? And that's where, it seems to me, I would argue, they should
take the form of norms that encourage and mandate contextual
judgment.
So I don't think that incompleteness in my argument is an
obstacle to its validity. One thing that Professor Krasik said was
that she interpreted my emphasis on legal rhetoric as an appeal to
expertise. I think there is an issue there. On the other hand, it
seems to me that the language of law is a much broader public
language than many others, especially today. I mean, the example
of John Grisham certainly shows that there is a popular legal
discourse that's related to the moral professional.
So I don't interpret the law solely in terms of a narrow expertise.
I think lay people can and should participate in these debates and
in the activity of professional regulation, but they should
participate in terms of the rhetoric that I am proposing.
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Now, it seems to me that a very important part of the picture of
lawyer ethical decision making is the lawyer's relation to the client.
Mr. Henderson is completely right that I don't say anything about
that. You know, at some point I should and will. Again, I think the
type of rhetorical style that I'm recommending is perfectly
compatible with one that has a lot of respect with the client's right
to participate in these decisions. Let me note, however, this one
qualification. One of the problems is that there has to be a set of
assumptions about what the client's authority is, and the limits of
what the client's entitled to ask you to do. Presumably that
decision cannot be left up to the client. That may be a discussion
that the client participates in, but one can't leave it up to the client
to decide the limits of what you can do.
Now, one small but maybe important quibble with Professor
Ledewitz. Professor Ledewitz characterized Rule 1.6, the permissive
part of 1.6, as a contextual norm. Rule 1.6 says you may not reveal
confidences - that's the categorical part - except where these
exceptions apply, in which case you may reveal confidences. That's
what Professor Ledewitz characterized as the contextual part. But
that's not what I understand by contextual judgment. A "may"
unaccompanied by any precepts, any rebuttable presumptions, any
illustrative cases; a "may" that's just the delegation to the personal
subjective concerns and literal concerns of the lawyer is not what I
mean by a contextual norm. A contextual norm is not an
unstructured or an individual decision. I think a contextual norm is
just a decision that involves informal consideration, application of
norms to the full range of considerations. But it's an intensely
structured decision, and it's a decision that's grounded in norms, so
it has some objectivity and some collective aspect to it.
Just let me respond briefly to Judge Folino's two interesting
questions. A very interesting kind of pure exponential question: If a
lawyer can, in fact, really be responsible to the interests and rights
of people other than the client, could a lawyer just resolve the
whole thing? A lot of people say, "You're asking the lawyer to act
as a judge." And in some respects, I think that it's not an
inappropriate way to put it.
You know, there is an increase in lawyer mediation, and in
lawyers actually acquiring responsibilities to adverse parties. We
are more tolerant of that role for lawyers. And, the Model Rules
actually do incorporate some legitimization for that role. So I
would say a qualified yes. On the other hand, I would also say that
there are many situations where that's not the way to go. As I said
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in the talk, I think the adversary system is perfectly compatible
with my approach, and it's also a very good way to make decisions.
In those situations, the idea of the contextual approach assumes
that there are some situations where you can recognize that the
lawyer is not in a position to decide what the outcome is. In that
situation, partisan advocacy of each side is the best way to make
the decision.
So I think all I'm saying is that lawyers can have a certain ability
to identify those situations. Then when they put themselves in the
partisan role, they should act as partisans in a way that contributes
to the ability of the trier to make a just decision, by not deceiving
the person, and by getting the evidence out in a coherent way.
And then maybe the hardest but certainly one of the most
interesting questions, which was posed by Judge Folino: "Why do
lawyers resist this?" Now, I actually thought that - help me out
here - the first thing you said was that partially they don't resist
it. In some practices, lawyers did embrace this type of lawyering.
But why do they resist more? And I don't know what the answer is,
but I do know it's not a unique phenomenon; people have been
known to resist things that they know are good. So, for example,
Dean Cafardi talks about substance abuse and alcohol abuse; the
kind of self-control that is inhibited by alcohol abuse is something
that we want, but yet not everybody can achieve that and they
resist it in various ways.
It's not inconceivable that this is another one of those goods that
is either kind of frightening and scary in some ways, or requires a
certain level of self-discipline or imagination to achieve, such that it
scares us off. Maybe we sense that, if we got there, we would be
proud of ourselves and happier, but the road to get there may be a
little daunting.
Let me stop there. Thanks very much.
PROFESSOR TAYLOR: I'll save my questions for dinner. I would at this
time entertain some questions, for the panelists or Bill, from the
floor.
SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: This is primarily for Professor Simon, but
also for all the panelists. Where do you see the intersection
between law, ethics, and morality?
PROFESSOR SIMON: Well, I don't know if I have an answer to that. I
think it's an ambiguity in the legal culture. And the ambiguity has
to do with what I call in the book the kind of ambiguity between a
positive and a substantive understanding of legality.
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If we understand law to be just the commands of the state, then
law has only an indirect relationship to morality. On the other
hand, if we want to define law in a way that gives it some sense of
obligation or duty, then we tend to embrace much broader
conceptions of legality that incorporate morality. And people like
Robert Gordon, for example, a legal theorist, who wanted a broad
- wanted to define law in a way that connotes that it's worthy of
respect - tend to be driven to incorporate more and more
morality into their understanding of law. Many of our institutions
are designed to incorporate morality; the jury, for example, does
not distinguish radically between positive law and moral law. The
norms of negligence, for example, explicitly incorporate social
norms.
So, because I want to promote this type of conversation that I
have in mind that would develop norms in a common law process,
I might have a more expansive definition of law that incorporates
most of the publicly available moral realm, because I think then the
conversation will be richer and the body of norms that will be felt
will be much richer. On the other hand, I can't say that that is
objectively or officially the conception of law that our system
maintains, because I think there's an ambiguity in the system.
SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR: Under the contextual theory of
professional ethics, could a lawyer ever represent a criminal
defendant who the lawyer believed was factually guilty?
PROFESSOR SIMON:

Well, sure. Even guilty people have defenses, for

example. I think the question is what can you do? You can
certainly argue for any mitigating circumstances; you can certainly
argue against excessively harsh punishment; or you can certainly
argue for minimal punishment that was plausibly applicable.
Certainly, my own belief, and I know it's shared by a lot of you,
is that a lot of punishment that's administered in the society today
is unjust, that the sentences are insanely harsh. Many people
believe capital punishment is always unjust. So I think that would
often be a very good reason for defending a factually guilty person.
Now, I must say that I cannot give a very good account of the
actual minimum that you would give a factually - a person who
was both factually guilty and facing a just punishment - what
would you give such a person? The system clearly prescribes that a
person is entitled to some defense. The presumption of innocence
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt clearly gives some rights to
that. I can't give a good account for those rights in that situation,
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but I don't think that criminal defense lawyers in general can give a
very good account. So I don't have a very good sense of exactly
what the limits are in that situation. I'm not denying that limits may
exist, but I think that's simply an incompleteness in my doctrine. I
just haven't figured out yet, if we assume not only factual guilt but
otherwise just punishment, to what extent representation that
would be designed to bring in a factual acquittal is justified. I find
it hard to draw a line. I don't find the lines that criminal defense
lawyers draw very plausible either. I don't think that's a problem
distinctively for me. I think that that's a problem in the area
generally.
SPEAKER FROM THE FLOOR:

From an ethical perspective, where do

you envision the legal profession to be in fifty years, or where do
you think it should be?
PROFESSOR SIMON:

Well, that's another question where the short

answer is "I don't know." I will say that there are two
developments that I want. I'm not saying these are the powerful
trends that are going to dominate. I say that, to me, they're the
most promising.
First of all, I like the fact that the inclusive bar associations, the
ABA and the state bar associations, are being increasingly trumped
by the administrative agencies, the courts, and other general law
making bodies. For example, I think that things like what the
Securities and Exchange Commission have done, and what the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have done, are steps in the right
direction.
And the other thing I like is that the specialized bar associations
are beginning to promulgate their own ethics codes, and they're
trying to race to the top, trying to provide institutional support for
lawyers who want to cultivate the reputational benefits of
commitment to a higher standard. So I just mention the American
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, for example, as a group that's
been out front. But there are, in fact, maybe a dozen of these
relatively specialized bar associations that have been quite
promising in developing their own ethics codes.
MR. HENDERSON: I wanted to pick up on the previous question
regarding representation of a criminal defendant who the lawyer
believes is factually guilty. There was a note in the Stanford Law
Review symposium by Professor Robin West entitled The Zealous
Advocacy of Justice in a Less than Ideal Legal World, and it's a
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commentary of Professor West's on Professor Simon's book.41 But
she says, "Professor Simon is not the first to address the apparent
amorality of lawyering with an argument that wasn't harmless so as
to drastically restructure the lawyers' adversarial role rather than
explain it to a doubtful public who obstinately fail to appreciate its
42
social value."
And we must start here, with law students understanding what
that role is, and that the role of representing the client is, at least
at this point, inviolate. And it has to include the ability of a defense
lawyer to be able to adequately represent a client that a lawyer
understands to be factually guilty, and to do whatever is necessary
- to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses, to file appropriate
motions, including motions to suppress evidence; specifically, to do
everything the lawyer must do, within ethical bounds.
If we cannot understand that, we'll never be able to have the
doubtful public understand it. The doubtful public understands it
when one individual in the doubtful public is arrested for driving
under the influence, because that person's interest and rights
coalesce to a point that he or she wants whatever adequate
representation that we can provide.
PROFESSOR TAYLOR: The last question, Professor.
SPEAKER FROM FLOOR: I'd like to go back to the teasing proposition
that perhaps a lawyer is doing the wrong thing in raising a statute
of limitations defense where the lawyer says the client has
confided, "Yes, I really do," or should the word be did, "hold the
money." To what extent is that different than asking whether the
lawyer should file a motion to suppress evidence in a criminal
charge where there was a failure to give a Miranda warning, an
incriminating statement has been given, tending to reveal the truth
of the matter? Aren't they exactly the same? And if they're not,
how are we to tell which version of the truth is entitled to be
raised up and which one must be put aside?
PROFESSOR SIMON: Well, you're assuming that I'm in favor of
representing people on suppression motions, which is true. I think
Mr. Henderson, I think, might have had some doubts on that.

41.
42.

See West, supra note 37.
Id.
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MR. HENDERSON: No. Me, no.
SIMON: Okay, but that's right. Here's what I say about the
statute of limitations: I'm not in favor - the statute of limitations
issue, I don't have a clear position on the statute of limitations
issue. The statute of limitations issue was designed to illustrate a
claim that lawyers ought to look to the purposes and the
underlying principles of the rules they involve on behalf of their
clients.
So I say whether it's appropriate to plead the statute in that
situation depends partly what the purpose of the statute is. And I
distinguish between two possible purposes. If the purpose is to
repose, if the purpose is that there's been a societal decision that
after a fixed period of time you should not have to answer to
claims that arise from the prior period, then it seems perfectly
consistent with that policy, that principle, to plead the statute even
though the client admits that the claim was valid.
On the other hand, another potential principle might be that the
purpose is to avoid adjudication on unreliable evidence, and the
concern that old evidence would be stale and, therefore, unreliable.
And I say if that's the purpose, then it's inconsistent with the
purpose to plead the statute, because there's no unreliability to the
issue. It's very clear that the factual determination is clear to the
lawyer. It may not be clear yet to the court. But it's clear to the
lawyer, and the lawyer should have no concern that there will be
an unreliable factual determination. And therefore, in that situation,
it would be inconsistent with the purpose to plead the statute.
Now, I'm told - and I did a little research actually on the statute
of limitations - and it's not my favorite kind of research - and
people say that while it's ambiguous, the more modern basis for
the statute is usually understood to be repose. In which case, I
think it's consistent to plead the statute. The older basis is
understood to be the stale evidence concept; in that case I think
you should not plead the statute.
PROFESSOR

PROFESSOR

TAYLOR:

Well, we bring to a conclusion the topic

Thinking Like a Lawyer-About Ethics. This topic is a good
omnium-gatherum, the gathering up of all the "this's" and the
"that's" and the fragments that the Rules of Professional Conduct
impose upon us.
I grew up as a lawyer under the Code of Professional
Responsibility. When I had to face teaching instead the Rules of
Professional Conduct, I thought to myself, "My God, the
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profession's micromanaging itself. The snake is now biting its own
tail." And I'm still trying to recover from that shock. I would rather
think about the question that Tom Henderson has suggested we
think about: What does representing the client mean? To
represent? Are we translators, translating from one realm to
another? Are we intervenors when we represent? Are we guides?
Are we instructors or interpreters? There are many issues
concerned with this word "representation."
Thinking Like a Lawyer-About Ethics, thinking like a lawyer
insofar as it is confined to the role of lawyering, may be a way for
lawyers to hide behind role morality. And thinking like a particular
role is acting; it is not thinking. It's acting according to script. I
came to law experienced in a natural science, namely physics.
Physicists wouldn't call .what lawyers do vis-A-vis the Rules of
Professional Conduct "thinking." They would call that politics or
ideology. My response to the law school mantra, "think like a
lawyer," has been that I've always wanted to raise my hand and
say, "Professor, first tell me about thinking itself." We never probed
thinking itself in law school. We never took it to "ground," so to
speak. Now, thinking about ethics, like a lawyer about ethics,
sounds like arm's length bargaining to me. It's sort of bikini ethics.
How little can we get away with as a lawyer and still be
respectable? Or it's like asking the question how often can I kiss
and not get mononucleosis? We lawyers seem to be afraid that
ethics would require us to transform ourselves, and therefore, we
try to keep real ethics at bay.
Let us first start thinking about thinking itself, and that means
letting ethics speak for itself. The notions of outside the law/inside
the law, extra-legal/inter-legal, are boundary notions that we should
reject because we are whole human beings. We should be like
Father Bernard Lonergan who told a friend of mine that he
(Lonergan) wanted to rattle around in economics until he found
God there. We in a Catholic law school should rattle around in
professional responsibility until we likewise find God there.
Real thinking, and we're called here to do what the philosopher
Heidegger said was the most thought provoking thing, the thing
that matters most in our era, and that is to begin to think about
thinking itself. For Heideggeran philosophy, thinking and thanking
are related. In German, dinken (thinking) and danken (thanking)
are related concepts. Professor Simon, I am thankful for your
thoughtful displeasure at the Model Rules and their
micromanagement of the practice of law. I am thankful for all the
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respondents and the hard work they did in taking time from busy
schedules to really read Bill's book in a very serious way. I think
legal practitioners are already suffering enough under the ravages
of post-modem late capitalism. Therefore, we need another mode
of approach to lawyering that is more akin to ministerial and
pastoral counseling, rather than prosecution and sanctioning under
the Rules.
Thinking Like a Lawyer-About Ethics. I want to end by
suggesting that ethics may mean thinking our way toward the
essential and into the essential. For us at the end of this
millennium, that's a most difficult task, because we have to ask
ourselves: What is disposable? We have to travel light into the next
millennium, and I think our speaker has shown us, and our
panelists have shown us, how difficult it is for the legal profession
or for any human being to come into what is essential.
Thank you all.

